In this article, we take advantage of a new source of data providing updates from the Majority Leader’s Office that signal the leadership’s positions on floor votes. We offer a more nuanced explanation of voting in the U.S. House as our findings suggest that not all procedural votes are created equal. While the most liberal members of the party vote with the leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.Yeshttps://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/manuscript-submission-guideline
We test two explanations of the legislative process for their ability to account for the ideological...
Theories of party power in Congress differ on the circumstances under which majority parties have th...
abstract: It is widely reported that partisanship in the United States Congress is at an historic hi...
Control of the floor agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives is integral if the majority party w...
Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals....
We offer a theory of strategic party disloyalty to explain roll call voting in the US House. Our the...
Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals....
This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives...
When describing how party leaders determined whose legislation to bring to the House floor for consi...
Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisio...
This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties building on ...
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain observed rates of party unity on roll-call voting in ...
This dissertation examines how partisan control of the voting agenda generates far-reaching and sign...
We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictio...
Cartel theory is based on the premise that there is an essential link between party in government an...
We test two explanations of the legislative process for their ability to account for the ideological...
Theories of party power in Congress differ on the circumstances under which majority parties have th...
abstract: It is widely reported that partisanship in the United States Congress is at an historic hi...
Control of the floor agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives is integral if the majority party w...
Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals....
We offer a theory of strategic party disloyalty to explain roll call voting in the US House. Our the...
Legislators and legislative parties must strike a balance between collective and member-level goals....
This article extends recent research on partisan agenda control in the U.S. House of Representatives...
When describing how party leaders determined whose legislation to bring to the House floor for consi...
Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisio...
This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties building on ...
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain observed rates of party unity on roll-call voting in ...
This dissertation examines how partisan control of the voting agenda generates far-reaching and sign...
We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictio...
Cartel theory is based on the premise that there is an essential link between party in government an...
We test two explanations of the legislative process for their ability to account for the ideological...
Theories of party power in Congress differ on the circumstances under which majority parties have th...
abstract: It is widely reported that partisanship in the United States Congress is at an historic hi...