Agenda Control and Electoral Success in the U.S. House

Cartel theory is based on the premise that there is an essential link between party in government and party in elections. Specifically, that theory---and much subsequent legislative research---rests on the assumption that agenda control is the essential mechanism used to manage the party brand; what does and does not get on the legislative agenda determines some portion of the electoral reward or punishment shared by all majority party members. Yet, an essential implication of the theory has never been tested: does successful legislative agenda control improve the electoral fortunes of majority party members? This letter tests this implication. Searching over 160,000 model specifications, we fail to find robust support for the hypothesis that successful agenda control yields electoral benefits to majority members in the US House. While this surprising result may not be definitive---and falls far short of toppling Cartel theory---it raises important questions regarding the mechanisms incentivizing legislative agenda control