We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, R&D races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public construction games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature
AbstractThis paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve repe...
Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the...
In this chapter, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in whic...
Copyright © 2019 The Authors.We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separa...
We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy ...
This paper offers a simple approach to study steady-state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynam...
Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the ...
In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certa...
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the...
There are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how manyplayers there will be in the ...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This p...
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelbe...
International audienceThere are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many player...
This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We s...
This paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve repeated pla...
AbstractThis paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve repe...
Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the...
In this chapter, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in whic...
Copyright © 2019 The Authors.We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separa...
We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy ...
This paper offers a simple approach to study steady-state Markov perfect equilibria arising in dynam...
Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the ...
In existing game theoretic settings the timing of moves is deterministic, i.e. they occur with certa...
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the...
There are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how manyplayers there will be in the ...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] This p...
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelbe...
International audienceThere are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many player...
This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We s...
This paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve repeated pla...
AbstractThis paper examines the stochastic processes generated by sequential games that involve repe...
Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the...
In this chapter, we consider the nonparametric identification of Markov dynamic games models in whic...