Add to ORKGSafety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety argument is considered acceptable, it is necessary to identify the weaknesses associated with the aspects of a safety argument and supporting evidence, and manage them. Confidence arguments are built to show the existence of sufficient confidence in the developed safety arguments. In this paper, we propose an approach to systematically constructing confidence arguments and identifying the weaknesses of the software safety arguments. The proposed approach is described and illustrated with a running example
When showing that a software system meets certain security requirements, it is often necessary to wo...
For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is...
Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they pro-vide a way to justify the safet...
Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety a...
International audienceSoftware applications dependability is frequently assessed through degrees of ...
The development of software for safety critical systems is guided by standards. Most standards ident...
International audienceConfidence in safety critical systems is often justified by safety arguments. ...
non-peer-reviewedWhen showing that a software system meets certain security requirements, it is ofte...
We describe a generic approach for automatically integrating the output generated from a formal meth...
Evaluation of assurance cases typically requires certifiers’ domain knowledge and experience, and, a...
Evaluation of assurance cases typically requires certifiers’ domain knowledge and experience, and, a...
In recent work, we have argued for a formal treatment of confidence about the claims made in dependa...
Safety cases present the arguments and evidence that can be used to justify the acceptable safety of...
The work described here concerns the use of so-called multi-legged arguments to support dependabilit...
Safety cases offer a means for communicating information about the system safety among the system st...
When showing that a software system meets certain security requirements, it is often necessary to wo...
For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is...
Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they pro-vide a way to justify the safet...
Safety arguments typically have some weaknesses. To show that the overall confidence in the safety a...
International audienceSoftware applications dependability is frequently assessed through degrees of ...
The development of software for safety critical systems is guided by standards. Most standards ident...
International audienceConfidence in safety critical systems is often justified by safety arguments. ...
non-peer-reviewedWhen showing that a software system meets certain security requirements, it is ofte...
We describe a generic approach for automatically integrating the output generated from a formal meth...
Evaluation of assurance cases typically requires certifiers’ domain knowledge and experience, and, a...
Evaluation of assurance cases typically requires certifiers’ domain knowledge and experience, and, a...
In recent work, we have argued for a formal treatment of confidence about the claims made in dependa...
Safety cases present the arguments and evidence that can be used to justify the acceptable safety of...
The work described here concerns the use of so-called multi-legged arguments to support dependabilit...
Safety cases offer a means for communicating information about the system safety among the system st...
When showing that a software system meets certain security requirements, it is often necessary to wo...
For any software system upon which lives depend, the most important question one can ask about it is...
Assurance cases are widely used in the safely domain, where they pro-vide a way to justify the safet...