POLITICS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ETHNIC REBELLION: THE ESCALATION OF ETHNIC TENSIONS FROM 1946 TO 2005

Qualitative theories of ethnic violence and rebellion have traditionally argued the importance of broad long-term processes that escalate ethnic tensions. Alternatively, quantitative scholarship has focused more narrowly on the question of onset. In this dissertation, I break with this tradition and quantitatively examine the structural factors associated with the escalation of ethnic tensions, including, but not limited to, the onset of ethnic rebellion. I build upon and refine elements of a power and legitimacy school of scholarship to shed light on three critical points of escalation in ethno-political power relations. First, the politicization of ethnic boundaries is more likely in states with limited resources and lower levels of ethnic diversity or abundant resources and higher levels of ethnic diversity. Second, in those states where ethnic boundaries have already been politicized, state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is more likely when resources are scarce and ethnic diversity is higher or resources are abundant and ethnic diversity is lower. Third, in those states where state sanctioned ethnic exclusion is practiced, ethnic rebellion is more likely when the size of the excluded population increases but the ethnic diversity of the excluded population remains lower. Importantly, even when the excluded population is very large, ethnic rebellions become less likely as the ethnic diversity of the excluded population increases. I test these hypotheses using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset, which includes the world's independent states from 1946 through 2005. Aside from the substantive contributions regarding the escalation of ethnic tensions, as a whole, the dissertation argues for, and demonstrates, the importance of quantitatively engaging with the entirety of qualitative theoretical perspectives, rather than just limiting quantitative inquiry to the onset of ethnic violence