Building upon the classical concept of H older continuity and the notion of \continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we de ne H older continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness assumption on the payo pro les (associated with outcomes), the following full characterization result holds for nite mechanisms: a social choice function is H older continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages.no
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
Robust virtual implementation asks if a social goal can be approximately achieved if merely the agen...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social cho...
Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner ...
Bergemann and Morris (2009b) show that static mechanisms cannot robustly virtually implement noncons...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When pr...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely-lived ...
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
Robust virtual implementation asks if a social goal can be approximately achieved if merely the agen...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social cho...
Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner ...
Bergemann and Morris (2009b) show that static mechanisms cannot robustly virtually implement noncons...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
A social choice rule (SCR) is a mapping from preference profiles to lotteries over outcomes. When pr...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely-lived ...
This paper investigates implementation of social choice functions in the complete information enviro...
Robust virtual implementation asks if a social goal can be approximately achieved if merely the agen...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...