Add to ORKGThis paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from influencing a client’s decision. A consulting paradox arises: the more the client needs advice, the less accurate is expert advice. The reason is that the expert’s benefit from influence engenders an incentive to misreport information which is positively related to the client’s need of advice. This paradox advances the debate on consulting beyond its focus on commissions and provides a new explanation to experts’ misreporting of information. Finally, the consulting paradox sheds light on the challenges posed by influence-hungry experts to client protection authorities and the consulting industry
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the paradoxical image of consultants as “experts w...
"The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9We ...
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
CFOs and other managers depend on consultants to provide advice on management control systems (MCS) ...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
<p>People give each other advice on a variety of topics throughout their lifetimes. In this dissert...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
We present a cheap talk model in which a receiver (R) sequentially consults multiple experts who are...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the paradoxical image of consultants as “experts w...
"The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9We ...
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
CFOs and other managers depend on consultants to provide advice on management control systems (MCS) ...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
Professionals often give advice to many anonymous people. For example, financial analysts give publi...
<p>People give each other advice on a variety of topics throughout their lifetimes. In this dissert...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is lik...