"The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The in troduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.Collaborative Research Center 88
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his rep...
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal might cancel an action initially reco...
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the informati...
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The exp...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The exp...
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the informati...
An evaluator estimates as precisely as possible the innate talent of a careerist expert by observing...
This paper considers the problem of a decision maker who is faced with a dynamic decision problem wi...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert that faces a conflict of interest with a decisio...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his rep...
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal might cancel an action initially reco...
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the informati...
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The exp...
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially starte...
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The exp...
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the informati...
An evaluator estimates as precisely as possible the innate talent of a careerist expert by observing...
This paper considers the problem of a decision maker who is faced with a dynamic decision problem wi...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert that faces a conflict of interest with a decisio...
We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert who faces a conflict of interest with a decision...
This paper studies expert advice when an influence-hungry expert derives an intrinsic benefit from infl...
We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his rep...