Add to ORKGThis paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed methodology
The Lyapunov function method is used in proving stability, asymptotic or globally asymptotic stabili...
International audienceThere are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many player...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...
This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium poi...
AbstractThis paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilib...
In this paper we consider a non-cooperative N players differential game affected by deterministic un...
dynamics to the analysis of oligopoly markets. This paper considered a game problem under the simult...
Equilibria in dynamic games are formulated often under the assumption that the players have full kno...
In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231--...
We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varyin...
We propose a finite time differential game as a model for some economic processes and derive conditi...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
The most of the oligopolistic models described in the existing literature analyze dynamic processes ...
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under th...
In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231\u...
The Lyapunov function method is used in proving stability, asymptotic or globally asymptotic stabili...
International audienceThere are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many player...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...
This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium poi...
AbstractThis paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilib...
In this paper we consider a non-cooperative N players differential game affected by deterministic un...
dynamics to the analysis of oligopoly markets. This paper considered a game problem under the simult...
Equilibria in dynamic games are formulated often under the assumption that the players have full kno...
In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231--...
We give a robust characterization of Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varyin...
We propose a finite time differential game as a model for some economic processes and derive conditi...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
The most of the oligopolistic models described in the existing literature analyze dynamic processes ...
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under th...
In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231\u...
The Lyapunov function method is used in proving stability, asymptotic or globally asymptotic stabili...
International audienceThere are real strategic situations where nobody knows ex ante how many player...
We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begin...