Add to ORKGThe paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of the infinitely repeated game, a Tullock contest is played by two players. We consider local stability of the Nash equilibrium with respect to adjustment speed and the level of the prize. The model is extended to an asymmetric valuation of the prize and to the case with an endogenous prize, where the level of the prize is influenced by the investments of the players.
We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 i...
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed...
I examine players' equilibrium effort levels in two-player asymmetric contests with ratio-form conte...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
We consider a two-player contest in which one contestant has a headstart advantage, but both can exe...
In this paper we study a two stage contest where the strength of players in the second stage depends...
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in...
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests,...
This paper constructs and analyzes open-loop equilibria in an infinitely repeated Tullock contest in...
We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evol...
This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest with a g...
Asymmetric contest games are examined under conditions which guarantee the existence of a unique pur...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in politica...
We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 i...
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed...
I examine players' equilibrium effort levels in two-player asymmetric contests with ratio-form conte...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
We consider a two-player contest in which one contestant has a headstart advantage, but both can exe...
In this paper we study a two stage contest where the strength of players in the second stage depends...
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in...
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests,...
This paper constructs and analyzes open-loop equilibria in an infinitely repeated Tullock contest in...
We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evol...
This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two player contest with a g...
Asymmetric contest games are examined under conditions which guarantee the existence of a unique pur...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in politica...
We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 i...
This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed...
I examine players' equilibrium effort levels in two-player asymmetric contests with ratio-form conte...