Add to ORKGAbstract. This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. W...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
International audienceThe purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in a partiti...
For any non collegial voting game, σ, there exists a stability dimension v*(σ), which can be readily...
A voting game σ is classified by two integers v*(σ),w*(σ),(v*(σ) v*(σ) the emptiness of the σ-core ...
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is presented. It...
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is presented. It...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q...
One proof of existence of general equilibrium assumes convexity and continuity of a preference corre...
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown tha...
Let σ be a social preference function, and let v (σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite s...
Abstract. In the spatial context, when preferences can be characterized bycircular indifference curv...
This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a g...
This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in vot...
Abstract. This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. W...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
International audienceThe purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in a partiti...
For any non collegial voting game, σ, there exists a stability dimension v*(σ), which can be readily...
A voting game σ is classified by two integers v*(σ),w*(σ),(v*(σ) v*(σ) the emptiness of the σ-core ...
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is presented. It...
A classification theorem for voting rules on a smooth choice space W of dimension w is presented. It...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q...
One proof of existence of general equilibrium assumes convexity and continuity of a preference corre...
Majority rule voting with smooth preferences on a smooth policy space W is examined. It is shown tha...
Let σ be a social preference function, and let v (σ) be the Nakamura number of σ. If W is a finite s...
Abstract. In the spatial context, when preferences can be characterized bycircular indifference curv...
This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undominated set to a g...
This short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets in vot...
Abstract. This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. W...
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a tournam...
International audienceThe purpose of this article is to analyze a class of voting games in a partiti...