Add to ORKGStrategies in a stochastic game are > 0 perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain equilibrium properties. Sufficient conditions are proven for the existence of perfect strategies for all > 0 implying the existence of equilibria for every > 0. Using this approach we prove the existence of equilibria for every > 0 for a special class of quitting games. The important technique of the proof belongs to algebraic topology and reveals that more general proofs for the existence of equilibria in stochastic games must involve the topological structure of how the equilibria of one-stage games are related to changes in the payoffs
We show the existence of almost stationary ε-equilibria, for all (H0, in zero-sum stochastic games w...
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, ...
In this paper a charactf'rization is given for equilibrium strategies in noncooperative dynamic game...
AbstractStrategies in a stochastic game are δ-perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ-...
AbstractStrategies in a stochastic game are δ-perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ-...
This paper presents a question of topological dynamics and demonstrates that its affirmation would e...
This paper presents a question of topological dynamics and demonstrates that its affirmation would e...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 743This chapter presents developments in the theory of s...
In this paper we prove the existence of p-equilibrium stationary strategies for non-zero-sum stochas...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
Strategic games with a potential function have quite often equilibria in pure strategies (Monderer a...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
For a broad definition of time-discrete stochastic games, their zero-sum varieties have values. But ...
For a broad definition of time-discrete stochastic games, their zero-sum varieties have values. But ...
We show the existence of almost stationary ε-equilibria, for all (H0, in zero-sum stochastic games w...
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, ...
In this paper a charactf'rization is given for equilibrium strategies in noncooperative dynamic game...
AbstractStrategies in a stochastic game are δ-perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ-...
AbstractStrategies in a stochastic game are δ-perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ-...
This paper presents a question of topological dynamics and demonstrates that its affirmation would e...
This paper presents a question of topological dynamics and demonstrates that its affirmation would e...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 743This chapter presents developments in the theory of s...
In this paper we prove the existence of p-equilibrium stationary strategies for non-zero-sum stochas...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
Strategic games with a potential function have quite often equilibria in pure strategies (Monderer a...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment...
For a broad definition of time-discrete stochastic games, their zero-sum varieties have values. But ...
For a broad definition of time-discrete stochastic games, their zero-sum varieties have values. But ...
We show the existence of almost stationary ε-equilibria, for all (H0, in zero-sum stochastic games w...
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, ...
In this paper a charactf'rization is given for equilibrium strategies in noncooperative dynamic game...