This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be invigorated. In our modem market system, vigorous vertical merger enforcement is a necessity. Strong enforcement is particularly important in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers to entry and durable market power. Even when there are parallel vertical mergers, the result may well be an anticompetitive reciprocal dealing, coordinated equilibrium rather than intense competition among efficient integrated firms. Stronger enforcement would involve several steps, including recognition that claims of elimination of double marginalization do not deserve to be silver bullets and that behavioral remedies are generally unable to prevent anticomp...
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of verti...
The economic and legal view of vertical integration has varied over time. But, a constant source of ...
A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition authorities shoul...
This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be invigorated. In our modern...
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not ...
The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in ...
Mergers and acquisitions are a major component of antitrust law and practice. The U.S. antitrust age...
Recently, federal regulators responsible for enforcing the antitrustlaws have shown a renewed intere...
International audienceWe develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal me...
We develop an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that, when a wave of mergers removes al...
The antitrust enforcement Agencies\u27 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical appl...
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Just...
Since the Supreme Court\u27s landmark 1963 decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, ...
The new Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines focus attentio...
The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of ve...
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of verti...
The economic and legal view of vertical integration has varied over time. But, a constant source of ...
A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition authorities shoul...
This Feature summarizes why and how vertical merger enforcement should be invigorated. In our modern...
There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not ...
The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal merger enforcement in ...
Mergers and acquisitions are a major component of antitrust law and practice. The U.S. antitrust age...
Recently, federal regulators responsible for enforcing the antitrustlaws have shown a renewed intere...
International audienceWe develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal me...
We develop an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that, when a wave of mergers removes al...
The antitrust enforcement Agencies\u27 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical appl...
We have revised our earlier listing of vertical merger enforcement actions by the Department of Just...
Since the Supreme Court\u27s landmark 1963 decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, ...
The new Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Vertical Merger Guidelines focus attentio...
The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of ve...
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of verti...
The economic and legal view of vertical integration has varied over time. But, a constant source of ...
A common justification that economists have historically given for why competition authorities shoul...