It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models of political economy and elsewhere. The main result has a number of corollaries, among them a dual characterization of the single-dipped do-main; it also implies that a single-crossing (`order-restricted\u27) domain can be minimally rich only if it is a subdomain of a single-peaked domain. The conclusions are robust as the results apply both to domains of stric...
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in ...
Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepea...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all ...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences o...
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005</p
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used ...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and ...
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in ...
Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepea...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all ...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences o...
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005</p
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used ...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
This paper contains an extensive combinatorial analysis of the single-peaked domain restriction and ...
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in ...
Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepea...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...