Add to ORKGAltres ajuts: UNSL/319502We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure
JEL Classification Codes: D7We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on t...
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private...
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on ...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilatt...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where...
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in ...
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005</p
JEL Classification Codes: D7We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on t...
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private...
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on ...
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles...
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilatt...
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich do-main of preferen...
We consider domains that exhibit single-peakedness only over a subset of alternatives. We call such ...
We characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function i...
We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function...
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric singl...
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing pre...
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of admissible sing...
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where...
We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in ...
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005</p
JEL Classification Codes: D7We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on t...
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private...
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on ...