Why Has the Eeducation Board System Stabilized ? : The Hypothesis of Rational Choice of the Governor, the Mayor and the Local Assembly by the New Institutionalism

This study is intended to present theoretical hypothesis why the education board system has stabilized. The most commonly accepted view is that the intention of the Ministry of Education, because it is able to control the board of education. This opinion also said that the governor, the mayor and the local assembly could not concern about education. This viewpoint, however, cannot explain why they had power when the law concerning the organization and functions of local educational administration was enacted. To solve this problem, this article presents this hypothesis ; the reason why the education board system has stabilized is the rational choice of the governor, the mayor and the local assembly. The hypothesis uses the theory of transaction cost approach and path dependence. Transaction costs consists of four costs, legislative decision-making costs, commit problem, agency costs, the cost of uncertainty. The governor and the mayor and the local assembly, act to minimize the sum of transaction costs. Under the circumstance of the politics of education in Japan by the middle of 1990\u27s, they chose to exist the education board system, which was independent of general administration. They delegate educational administration to the education board and didn\u27t commit by themselves. In addition, path dependence makes more difficult to change the system. However, they have insisted on disuse of the education board system since a few years ago. This is because the environment, cold war and the conflict of the Ministry of Education versus the Japan teachers’ union, has changed