Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities

A number of philosophers have attempted to solve the problem of null-probability possible events in\ud Bayesian epistemology by proposing that there are infinitesimal probabilities.\ud Hajek (2003) (more tentatively) and Easwaran (2014) (more definitively) have argued that because there is no way to specify a particular hyperreal extension\ud of the real numbers, solutions to the regularity problem involving infinitesimals, or at least hyperreal infinitesimals, involve an\ud unsatisfactory ineffability or arbitrariness.\ud The arguments depend on the alleged impossibility of picking out a particular hyperreal extension of the real numbers and/or of a particular value\ud within such an extension due to the\ud use of the Axiom of Choice. However, it is false that the Axiom of Choice precludes a specification of\ud a hyperreal extension---such an extension can indeed be specified. Moreover, for all we know, it is possible to explicitly specify particular\ud infinitesimals within such an extension. Nonetheless, I prove that because any regular probability measure that has infinitesimal values\ud can be replaced by one that has all the same intuitive features but other infinitesimal values, the heart of the arbitrariness objection\ud remains