<Articles>Britain's Post-War World Strategy and the 'One-World Economy' : The Attlee Labour Government's External Economic Policy, 1949-51

個人情報保護のため削除部分あり一九五〇年アトリー労働党政権は、戦後イギリスの世界戦略として、政治的には英米関係を軸にする西側体制を、経済的には「一つの世界経済(one world economy) 」の考えに基づく英連邦、北米、欧州を包含した西側経済を構想した。その構想を実現するひとつの柱は、国際通貨スターリングの維持、強化であった。この事実を念頭に置くならば、スターリング強化を中心課題に据え、さらに交換性回復までも論じつつ展開したアトリー政権の対外経済政策は、単にスターリングエリアへの固執を反映したのではなく、戦後世界形成に立ち向かうイギリスの模索と密接に連関するものとして理解されなければならない。また、かかるアトリー政権の対外経済政策の展開を踏まえることで、五〇年六月の朝鮮戦争勃発を契機とするイギリスの「軍備拡張政策(Rearmament) 」には、英米関係を軸とする西側経済の組織化という、これまで十分には注目されていない、重要なねらいがあったことも理解できよう。In 1950 the Attlee Labour government realized that post-war Britain's prosperity, safety and its status as a great power could be secured under the 'Western System'. The Western System would be enhanced, politically, through developing the Anglo-American special relationship and the Atlantic Community and, economically, through supporting a single multilateral trade and payments system covering the Sterling Area, North America and Western Europe. Enhancing the Western System would also serve to contain European integration so as not to undermine Britain's position as a principal ally of the United States. This article concludes that consolidating sterling as an international currency had a crucial role for Britain's world strategy, in other words, developing and enhancing the Western System. Though Labour ministers found the Sterling Area connexions very important to overcome dollar shortage and were concerned about the ramifications of sterling convertibility on their full employment policy, it is too much simplification to understand the Attlee government's sterling policy as the inwards Imperial and Sterling Area policy. This article reconsiders the Attlee government's external economic policy from 1949 until 1951, and especially examines 'Fundamentals' Anglo-American economic discussions, the establishment of European Payments Union, the London Conference of Foreign Ministers (May 1950) and the discussions of the OEEC Third Report in the summer of 1950. Finally, this article reveals that the Attlee Cabinet considered Rearmament (initiated in the autumn of 1950) as an opportunity for establishing British leadership in the Western economy, while they could delay facing the full ramifications of sterling convertibility