Add to ORKGMany believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral ignorance excuse. I argue that the exculpatory force of moral ignorance—or lack thereof—poses a thus far overlooked challenge to moral realism. I show, firstly, that if there were any mind-independent moral truths, we would not expect there to be an asymmetry in exculpatory force between moral and ordinary ignorance at all. I then consider several attempts the realist might make to deny or accommodate this datum, and show why none of them work
A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form o...
Moral realism, as I conceive it, is the view that there are moral facts that are independent of what...
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epist...
Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral i...
When you make a moral judgment, say you judge that it is morally wrong to eat meat, do you afterward...
Non‐moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spoo...
Is moral realism compatible with the existence of moral disagreements? Since moral realism requires ...
There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range f...
This dissertation is a moral realist response to the antirealist argument from the explanatory inade...
The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is ...
If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do no...
Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable...
Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been ...
Common parlance seems to presuppose that there is genuine moral knowledge. We hear people say that s...
My aim in this thesis is to examine two sources of plausibility for moral anti-realism. First, I add...
A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form o...
Moral realism, as I conceive it, is the view that there are moral facts that are independent of what...
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epist...
Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral i...
When you make a moral judgment, say you judge that it is morally wrong to eat meat, do you afterward...
Non‐moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spoo...
Is moral realism compatible with the existence of moral disagreements? Since moral realism requires ...
There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range f...
This dissertation is a moral realist response to the antirealist argument from the explanatory inade...
The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is ...
If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do no...
Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable...
Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been ...
Common parlance seems to presuppose that there is genuine moral knowledge. We hear people say that s...
My aim in this thesis is to examine two sources of plausibility for moral anti-realism. First, I add...
A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form o...
Moral realism, as I conceive it, is the view that there are moral facts that are independent of what...
This paper has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epist...