In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence
Chapter one introduces the thesis, and the relationships between the different chapters. The second ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with ...
Three essays examine the impact of asymmetric information on firm behavior in markets threatened by ...
Three essays examine the impact of asymmetric information on firm behavior in markets threatened by ...
Recent progress in the theory of entry-deterrence has cast strong doubts on the validity of the limi...
We examine the relationship between the equilibrium number of the firms entering the market and soci...
Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they have the opportunity to buy informati...
Martin models Cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation betw...
It is well‐known that, in a competitive market, the numberof firms in a free‐entry equilibrium is th...
Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information abou...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
When focusing on firm’s risk-aversion in industry equilibrium, the number of firms may be either lar...
Chapter one introduces the thesis, and the relationships between the different chapters. The second ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with ...
Three essays examine the impact of asymmetric information on firm behavior in markets threatened by ...
Three essays examine the impact of asymmetric information on firm behavior in markets threatened by ...
Recent progress in the theory of entry-deterrence has cast strong doubts on the validity of the limi...
We examine the relationship between the equilibrium number of the firms entering the market and soci...
Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they have the opportunity to buy informati...
Martin models Cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation betw...
It is well‐known that, in a competitive market, the numberof firms in a free‐entry equilibrium is th...
Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information abou...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
When focusing on firm’s risk-aversion in industry equilibrium, the number of firms may be either lar...
Chapter one introduces the thesis, and the relationships between the different chapters. The second ...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
DOI
Add to ORKG