The paper studies a two-stage location-price duopoly game in a disk city with consumer concentration around the city center. When consumers are uniformly distributed over the plane, unconstrained firms locate outside of the city. Consumer concentration, however, induces firms to locate nearer to each other and, when the degree of concentration is sufficiently high, inside of the city. Prices and firm profits decrease in the degree of consumer concentration. We explicitly solve the model for classes of cone-shaped, dome-shaped, and bell-shaped consumer densities. In all cases we identify a loss of welfare due to the strategic effect which causes the firms’ spatial differentiation being too large
This paper develops a free-entry spatial model that provides theoretical assessments for explaining ...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a location in ord...
The paper studies a two-stage location-price duopoly game in a disk city with consumer concentration...
This note considers Hotelling’s (1929) model of locational choices by two firms and subsequent price...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We study the impact of the urban location of one single public facility on spatial competition à la ...
In the framework Hotelling-Downs competition two players can freely choose a position along a one-di...
The three chapters of this dissertation contribute to the understanding of strategic firm behavior i...
We study a model in which a linear city of length 1 exists along the abscissa of a line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1),...
This paper investigates empirically the effect of anticipated price competition and distribution cos...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can differ...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper develops a free-entry spatial model that provides theoretical assessments for explaining ...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a location in ord...
The paper studies a two-stage location-price duopoly game in a disk city with consumer concentration...
This note considers Hotelling’s (1929) model of locational choices by two firms and subsequent price...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can diffe...
We study the impact of the urban location of one single public facility on spatial competition à la ...
In the framework Hotelling-Downs competition two players can freely choose a position along a one-di...
The three chapters of this dissertation contribute to the understanding of strategic firm behavior i...
We study a model in which a linear city of length 1 exists along the abscissa of a line (0 ≤ x ≤ 1),...
This paper investigates empirically the effect of anticipated price competition and distribution cos...
We analyze a two-stage game in a vertically differentiated duopoly with two regions which can differ...
We analyse how equilibrium locations in location-price games à la Hotelling are affected when firms ...
This paper examines the equilibrium of location of N vertically-linked firms. In a spatial economy c...
This paper develops a free-entry spatial model that provides theoretical assessments for explaining ...
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at som...
In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a location in ord...