Knowing-‘wh’, Mention-Some Readings, and Non-Reducibility

<p>his article presents a new criticisms of <em>reductive</em> approaches to knowledge-‘<em>wh</em>’ (i.e., those approaches on which whether one stands in the knowledge-‘<em>wh</em>’ relation to a question is determined by whether one stands in the knowledge-‘<em>that</em>’ relation to some answer(s) to the question). It argues in particular that the truth of a knowledge-‘<em>wh</em>’ attribution like ‘<em>Janna knows where she can buy an Italian newspaper</em>’ depends not only on what Janna knows about the availability of Italian newspapers, but on what she believes about the matter. This dependence of Janna's knowledge-‘<em>wh</em>’ on her (possibly false) beliefs is incompatible with the reductive approach.