Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard and Kallestrup jonathan schaffer

In ‘‘Knowing the Answer’ ’ I argued that knowledge-wh is question-rel-ative. For example, to know when the movie starts is to know the answer p to the question Q of when the movie starts. Berit Brogaard and Jesper Kallestrup have each responded with insightful critiques of my argument, and novel accounts of knowledge-wh. I am grateful to them both for continuing the discussion in so thoughtful a way. In §1 I will recap the main argument of ‘‘Knowing the Answer,’ ’ and revise my account in accord with a suggestion from both Brogaard and Kallestrup. In §2 I will reply to Brogaard’s objections, and argue that her positive account does not apply to interrogative wh-clauses at all. In §3 I will critique Kallestrup’s positive account, and reply to his revenge argument. 1.1. Terminology A knowledge-wh ascription is an ascription of knowledge in which the complement clause is an interrogative wh-clause (as opposed to a declarative ‘‘that’’-clause). Examples include ‘‘Ann knows when the movie starts,’ ’ ‘‘Ann knows who wrote the script,’ ’ ‘‘Ann knows how the movie ends,’ ’ and ‘‘Ann knows where to buy the tickets.’’ Knowledge-wh ascriptions are convergent iff their interrogative wh-clauses denote questions with the same true answer. Supposing that there is in fact a goldfinch in the garden, the following are convergent: ‘‘I know whether there is a goldfinch in the garden, or a raven,’ ’ ‘‘I know whether there is a goldfinch in the garden, or a canary,’ ’ and ‘‘I know whether there is a goldfinch in the garden, or at the neighbor’s.’’ An account of knowledge is binary iff it renders knowledge as a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition: Ksp. An account of SYMPOSIUM 47