The Changing Value of Seniority in the U.S. House: Conditional Party Government Revised

In this paper we argue that institutional changes to the seniority system have electoral consequences to incumbents. Building on the theory of Conditional Party Government, we argue that the consolidation of power in the hands of party leadership reduces the electoral value of seniority. This reduction occurs because power that was previously in the hands of committee chairs, whose roles are obtained through seniority, is ceded to party leaders. We present empirical evidence supporting this argument. Our findings suggest that the “condition” of Conditional Party Government, i.e. preference homogeneity among the majority party, is only a necessary condition; in order for centralization to occur, party reformers must also overcome the opposition of entrenched senior members. The empirical results suggest that studies of electoral outcomes should include institutional variables in their statistical models, and that studies of legislative institutions should consider electoral consequences when modeling rule changes made by legislators.Governmen