Lo psicodramma della Banca Centrale Europea e la sindrome tedesca. Alcune considerazioni sul ruolo della BCE alla luce della sentenza del Bundesverfassungsgericht sulla legittimità delle OMT

By decision of 7 February 2014, the German Constitutional Court (BVG) has referred to the European Court of Justice the decision on the legality of the plan OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions), adopted in September 2012 by the European Central Bank to counter the risk of a breakup of the euro. The BVG considers the OMT an act of economic policy, not monetary policy, thus exceeding the powers granted to the ECB by the Treaties. It is unimportant for the purposes of the BVG (restore the chain transmission of money), but its primary direct effect ( the reduction in the spread of some states). The German Court would be willing to accept the plan OMT if it were subjected to limitations in the size of the interventions and the impact on financial markets and whether the ECB was granted the status of a secured creditor. The reconstructions of the rules and the events raised in the judgment of the BVG provide the opportunity to carry out some reflections on the floor of the interpretation of the fundamental rules of the European Union, as well as the role played by the ECB in resolving the Eurozone crisis