<p>Simulations are for , (top) on and for (bottom). In the plots of average perspectives of cooperators and defectors black regions indicate the absence of cooperation or defection.</p
<p>(left) Dependence of on for various values of (see legend) for on a square lattice. (right) ...
<p>It is interesting to observe that too high initial values of may act detrimental on the evolutio...
<p>Form left to right, the snapshots are given at t = 0, 1, 3, 5, 100 steps for all panels. Depicted...
<p><b>, </b><b>on a </b><b>lattice.</b> The lines give trajectories for the (i) average density of c...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
<p>Note that the arrows denote the end of enduring (END) period and the beginning of expanding (EXP)...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
<p>(a) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors at different time steps in the absenc...
<p>(left) Dependence of the fraction of cooperators on the dilemma strength for various values of ...
<p>This figure plots the average cooperation rate of the final round of the last 500 generations of ...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the average interaction cooperator numbers of a cooperator () and a defector ()...
<p>The intersection of with horizontal line (dashed line) represents the values of fraction of coo...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>(left) Dependence of on for various values of (see legend) for on a square lattice. (right) ...
<p>It is interesting to observe that too high initial values of may act detrimental on the evolutio...
<p>Form left to right, the snapshots are given at t = 0, 1, 3, 5, 100 steps for all panels. Depicted...
<p><b>, </b><b>on a </b><b>lattice.</b> The lines give trajectories for the (i) average density of c...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
<p>Note that the arrows denote the end of enduring (END) period and the beginning of expanding (EXP)...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
<p>(a) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors at different time steps in the absenc...
<p>(left) Dependence of the fraction of cooperators on the dilemma strength for various values of ...
<p>This figure plots the average cooperation rate of the final round of the last 500 generations of ...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the average interaction cooperator numbers of a cooperator () and a defector ()...
<p>The intersection of with horizontal line (dashed line) represents the values of fraction of coo...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>(left) Dependence of on for various values of (see legend) for on a square lattice. (right) ...
<p>It is interesting to observe that too high initial values of may act detrimental on the evolutio...
<p>Form left to right, the snapshots are given at t = 0, 1, 3, 5, 100 steps for all panels. Depicted...
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