<p>Panel (a) depicts the average interaction cooperator numbers of a cooperator () and a defector () as a function of time step <i>t</i>. Panel (b) depicts the contour plot of reputation distribution in the population drawn as a function of time step <i>t</i>. It can be observed that during the evolutionary process different cooperators’ clusters are typically maintained in the population, leading to interaction segregation in purely cooperative populations. Here, and other parameters are the same as those in <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0036260#pone-0036260-g001" target="_blank">Fig. 1</a>.</p
The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individu-als is a fascinating topic that has ...
<p>Evolutionary chromodynamics in finite populations. The red cooperator population is invaded by re...
Spatial clustering is thought to favour the evolution of cooperation because it puts cooperators in ...
<p>Panel (a) shows the average number of cooperators’ reputation clusters as a function of <i>h</i>...
<p>These panels are related to different migration patterns: no migration, local migration with , ...
<p>Panel(a) Persistence of the cooperative behavior. The likelihood of fixation of cooperators as a ...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
<p>Panel a: <b>S</b> mutants, initially in small frequency, are favored as they derive more net bene...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
<p>(a), (b) and (c) depict the distributions of individual strategies as recorded at 0, 20, 2000 ste...
<p>Upper left panel: Probability of fixation of the cooperative strategy (triangles) and probability...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively inte...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively int...
The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individu-als is a fascinating topic that has ...
<p>Evolutionary chromodynamics in finite populations. The red cooperator population is invaded by re...
Spatial clustering is thought to favour the evolution of cooperation because it puts cooperators in ...
<p>Panel (a) shows the average number of cooperators’ reputation clusters as a function of <i>h</i>...
<p>These panels are related to different migration patterns: no migration, local migration with , ...
<p>Panel(a) Persistence of the cooperative behavior. The likelihood of fixation of cooperators as a ...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
<p>Panel a: <b>S</b> mutants, initially in small frequency, are favored as they derive more net bene...
<p>The lines embedded with solid triangle, square, and circle represent the evolutionary trajectorie...
<p>(a), (b) and (c) depict the distributions of individual strategies as recorded at 0, 20, 2000 ste...
<p>Upper left panel: Probability of fixation of the cooperative strategy (triangles) and probability...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively inte...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively int...
The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individu-als is a fascinating topic that has ...
<p>Evolutionary chromodynamics in finite populations. The red cooperator population is invaded by re...
Spatial clustering is thought to favour the evolution of cooperation because it puts cooperators in ...