Consequences of a Nuclear India: The United States and Australian failure to bring India into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

In 1968, the cornerstone of the regime aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature after many years of painstaking negotiation in the United Nations. The ultimate success of the nuclear non-proliferation regime at its inception depended solely upon its reception throughout the world. But at this critical juncture in 1968, three states essential to the success of the nuclear non-proliferation regime – India, Pakistan and Israel – chose not to join and to this day remain non-signatories. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been of particular concern to the United States since the exit of the British Raj in 1947. Yet Australia (largely regarded as a leader in nuclear non-proliferation efforts) and the United States (which along with Russia is one of the main proponents of the NPT) have consistently failed to inspire sufficient confidence within the Indian government to join the NPT. This paper focuses on the decision of India not to join the NPT, and the sustained yet failed efforts of the Australian and United States governments to bring them into the Treaty. It also provides a unique historical analysis of a timely topic in terms of the recent nuclear deal between the United States and India, and Australia’s subsequent decision to sell uranium to India