U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord (2001-2009): Adjusting the Incongruity in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime.

For over three decades, U.S. proscribed the transfer of advanced nuclear technologies to India - being a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT). In 1998, in an unparalleled challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, India traversed the nuclear threshold and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, inviting repulsiveness of Washington in the form of sanctions. India's pursuit for advanced technology posed a persistent challenge to the NPT-centric nuclear non- proliferation regime. Despite the technological embargoes imposed by U.S, India's nuclear breakout in 1998 was inevitable and U.S. couldn't deal with it effectively. Article IX of the NPT, which details its membership, states very clearly the criteria of membership of the treaty but bypasses completely the issue of the non-members who are nuclear states. This is consequential, of course, from the premise that states that tested after 1967 are not NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, as detailed in the same article. By 2005, there is a complete transformation in U.S nuclear policy and so the Bush administration resumes full civilian nuclear cooperation with India. As India fits that description, a contract between India and a member of NPT becomes problematic and controversial. The 2005 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement provoked sharp reactions and opened up a new Pandora's box. The indo-nuclear deal suggests trade in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes between the United States which is the signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and India, which is not. This research examines the evolution of the change in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy towards India. It looks at the triad relationship between U.S. Nuclear non-proliferation policy, India's nuclear non-proliferation policy and the Nuclear non-proliferation Regime. The research through this triad relationship investigates whether this Nuclear deal between India and U.S. marks a major change or just a tweak in the nuclear non-proliferation regime to accommodate a de facto nuclear state that is India within the regime. This study utilises regime theory to investigate whether the Indo-US nuclear accord fits in the existing fabric of the nuclear regime, which offers no broader framework for countries that have not signed the NPT and yet are in effect nuclear weapon states. The trajectory of the U.S.-India relationship was checked by huge antagonism with respect to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This thesis displays an intriguing, presumably remarkable, detailed analysis of how unique points of view with respect to a specific regime can create friction between two states—particularly, if one state is an advocate and a participant and the other is a non-participant. This research further highlights how a non-member state, that declined to accede to an establishing agreement of a regime, was accommodated within the setting of the principles and norms of the regime. This thesis could be valuable to other remarkable cases, particularly where the enthusiasm of the international group lies in the general acceptance of a regime