People’s risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically more risk averse for gains than for losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed th...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the ‘Description - Experience (DE) gap’, which posit...
Most decisions occur in the context of uncertainty. Usually we do not possess explicit knowledge of ...
People’s risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on ...
When people make risky decisions based on past experience, they must rely on memory. The nature of t...
Abstract When making decisions on the basis of past experiences, people must rely on their memories....
Recent experimental evidence in experience-based decision-making suggests that people are more risk ...
Both memory and choice are influenced by context: Memory is enhanced when encoding and retrieval con...
When trying to make sense of uncertain situations, we might rely on summary information from a descr...
Previous research has indicated a bias in memory-based decision-making, with people preferring optio...
Risky decisions based on the combination of different sources of information (e.g., decisions from d...
People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. t...
In three experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of decision making and memory can pred...
A framing bias shows risk aversion in problems framed as "gains" and risk seeking in problems framed...
Subjective inferences of probability play a critical role in decision-making. How we learn about cho...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the ‘Description - Experience (DE) gap’, which posit...
Most decisions occur in the context of uncertainty. Usually we do not possess explicit knowledge of ...
People’s risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on ...
When people make risky decisions based on past experience, they must rely on memory. The nature of t...
Abstract When making decisions on the basis of past experiences, people must rely on their memories....
Recent experimental evidence in experience-based decision-making suggests that people are more risk ...
Both memory and choice are influenced by context: Memory is enhanced when encoding and retrieval con...
When trying to make sense of uncertain situations, we might rely on summary information from a descr...
Previous research has indicated a bias in memory-based decision-making, with people preferring optio...
Risky decisions based on the combination of different sources of information (e.g., decisions from d...
People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. t...
In three experiments, we studied the extent to which theories of decision making and memory can pred...
A framing bias shows risk aversion in problems framed as "gains" and risk seeking in problems framed...
Subjective inferences of probability play a critical role in decision-making. How we learn about cho...
The leading normative (von Neumann & Morgen- stern, 1947) and descriptive psychological theories (e....
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the ‘Description - Experience (DE) gap’, which posit...
Most decisions occur in the context of uncertainty. Usually we do not possess explicit knowledge of ...