Similarity and rules: distinct? exhaustive? empirically distinguishable?

The distinction between rule-based and similarity-based processes in cognition is of fundamental importance for cognitive science, and has been the focus of a large body of empirical research. However, intuitive uses of the distinction are subject to theoretical difficulties and their relation to empirical evidence is not clear. We propose a 'core' distinction between rule-and similarity-based processes, in terms of the way representations of stored information are 'matched' with the representation of a novel item. This explication captures the intuitively clear-cut cases of processes of each type, and resolves apparent problems with the rule/similarity distinction. Moreover, it provides a clear target for assessing the psychological and Al literatures. We show that many lines of psychological evidence are less conclusive than sometimes assumed, but suggest that converging lines of evidence may be persuasive. that the Al literature suggests that approaches which combine rules and similarity are an important new focus for empirical work. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V