Add to ORKGThis chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not)
All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken ...
The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be acc...
The paper argues that pain is not a good counter-example to the privation theory of evil. Objectors ...
This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the questio...
Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pa...
Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pa...
It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when p...
Among philosophers there is considerable division concerning the propriety and the analysis of talki...
Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they see...
Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they see...
The standard view in philosophy treats pains as phenomenally conscious mental states. This view has ...
Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain...
It is often held that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish between a pain and a pain experie...
Introduction: The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of P...
Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experie...
All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken ...
The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be acc...
The paper argues that pain is not a good counter-example to the privation theory of evil. Objectors ...
This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the questio...
Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pa...
Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pa...
It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when p...
Among philosophers there is considerable division concerning the propriety and the analysis of talki...
Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they see...
Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they see...
The standard view in philosophy treats pains as phenomenally conscious mental states. This view has ...
Is a phenomenal pain a conscious primitive or composed of more primitive phenomenal states? Are pain...
It is often held that it is conceptually impossible to distinguish between a pain and a pain experie...
Introduction: The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of P...
Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experie...
All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken ...
The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be acc...
The paper argues that pain is not a good counter-example to the privation theory of evil. Objectors ...