Add to ORKGHow should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (2011a, Ch. 8) offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g...
According to Intellectualism knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a ...
This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held ...
How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (2011a, Ch. 8...
In his most recent book, Know How, Stanley [Know how, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2011b)] defe...
The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a...
The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. After Edmund Gettier (1963) proved the insufficienc...
One thing that nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamp...
In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequ...
Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maint...
Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and...
A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem"
In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in parti...
Epistemology is that part of philosophy which studies knowledge, and tries to answer questions like:...
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g...
According to Intellectualism knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a ...
This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held ...
How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (2011a, Ch. 8...
In his most recent book, Know How, Stanley [Know how, Oxford University Press: Oxford, (2011b)] defe...
The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a...
The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. After Edmund Gettier (1963) proved the insufficienc...
One thing that nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamp...
In this chapter, we will explore the luck at issue in Gettier-styled counterexamples and the subsequ...
Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maint...
Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and...
A critical review of “Gettier” cases and theoretical attempts to solve “the” "Gettier" "problem"
In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in parti...
Epistemology is that part of philosophy which studies knowledge, and tries to answer questions like:...
According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g...
According to Intellectualism knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a ...
This work, “The Nothingness” of the Gettier Problem is an attempt to deconstruct the popularly held ...