The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs\u27 expected recovery at trial compared to their filing costs, whereas the social value consists of the incentives suits create for injurers to invest in accident avoidance. Generally, there is no relationship between these two values: there may be either too many or too few suits from a social perspective. Thus, there is scope for corrective measures, although there is no simple policy. Extending the model to consider a negligence rule rather than strict liability, and to allow for pretrial settlements, leads to some modified conclusions but does not alter the basic insights
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under...
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient b...
In a 1991 paper, Polinsky and Che argue that lowering plaintiffs’ recovery and raising defendants’ d...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs\u27 expected recovery at trial compared to thei...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs ’ expected recovery at trial compared to their ...
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims ca...
The question is asked how the incentives of private parties to bring suit relate to what would be so...
This paper integrates the literatures on the social value of lawsuits, the evolution of the law, and...
Professors Polinsky and Che advocate "decoupling" what plaintiffs recover from what defendants pay i...
This paper examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation, and presents the conditions ...
The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppo...
In spite of its tenure as the prevailing economic theory of strict liability, the proposition that s...
We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and barg...
The legal system is a very expensive social institution. Increasingly we read about the volume and t...
A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that...
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under...
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient b...
In a 1991 paper, Polinsky and Che argue that lowering plaintiffs’ recovery and raising defendants’ d...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs\u27 expected recovery at trial compared to thei...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs ’ expected recovery at trial compared to their ...
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims ca...
The question is asked how the incentives of private parties to bring suit relate to what would be so...
This paper integrates the literatures on the social value of lawsuits, the evolution of the law, and...
Professors Polinsky and Che advocate "decoupling" what plaintiffs recover from what defendants pay i...
This paper examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation, and presents the conditions ...
The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppo...
In spite of its tenure as the prevailing economic theory of strict liability, the proposition that s...
We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and barg...
The legal system is a very expensive social institution. Increasingly we read about the volume and t...
A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that...
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under...
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient b...
In a 1991 paper, Polinsky and Che argue that lowering plaintiffs’ recovery and raising defendants’ d...