Add to ORKGThis paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence. By deterrence, I refer to the effect of the threat of liability on the care exercised by potential injurers. More precisely, this paper takes litigation costs as given and examines the social desirability of the levels of care exercised under negligence and under strict liability
A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that...
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, with an emp...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their f...
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under...
This article examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation and presents conditions und...
revision of an earlier paper titled “Welfare Implications of Strict Liability with Costly Litigation...
One of the principal results in the economic theory of liability is that, assuming litigation is cos...
The law of negligence purports to have a deterrent effect. By suing someone, and having that person ...
In spite of its tenure as the prevailing economic theory of strict liability, the proposition that s...
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims ca...
In this article, private enforcement under negligence when there is legal error and litigation is co...
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their li...
This article examines compliance, incentives to bring suit, and incentives to settle in a negligence...
The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, m...
This paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. Our framework ...
A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that...
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, with an emp...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their f...
This paper examines the influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under...
This article examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation and presents conditions und...
revision of an earlier paper titled “Welfare Implications of Strict Liability with Costly Litigation...
One of the principal results in the economic theory of liability is that, assuming litigation is cos...
The law of negligence purports to have a deterrent effect. By suing someone, and having that person ...
In spite of its tenure as the prevailing economic theory of strict liability, the proposition that s...
This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims ca...
In this article, private enforcement under negligence when there is legal error and litigation is co...
Potential defendants faced with the prospect of tort or tort-like damage actions can reduce their li...
This article examines compliance, incentives to bring suit, and incentives to settle in a negligence...
The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, m...
This paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. Our framework ...
A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that...
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, with an emp...
The private value of lawsuits is based on plaintiffs' expected recovery at trial compared to their f...