Dominant corporate agents and the power elite in France and Britain (previous version)

Author's post-print version. The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the journal Organization Studies by Sage; available online on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/Replaced by: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/3768Corporate elites are not a new phenomenon. However, the ways in which significant agents gain ascendancy to positions of power vary across nations and cultures. This paper analyses the ascension of a small minority of corporate agents to positions of dominance and the subsequent accession of a select few to the power elite. Our theoretical position builds upon the writings of Pierre Bourdieu on power and domination. These constructs are elaborated and made tangible through a cross-national comparative study of dominant corporate agents in France and Britain. Our results demonstrate the extent to which power remains concentrated in the French and British corporate sectors; highlighting equally pronounced similarities and differences between the two countries. It is suggested that power elites function through governance networks to promote institutional and organizational goals