Empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind-ing period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky asset. In an experimental study, we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period to analyze how both variables alone contribute to the change in myopia and how they interact. We find a strong effect for the length of commitment, a much less pro-nounced effect for the feedback frequency, and a strong interaction between both variables. The results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision making
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently are...
In this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by analyzing individu...
We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy an...
Empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind-ing period ...
Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of...
We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA...
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominent explanation for the equity premium ...
In a recent QJE-article, Gneezy and Potters (1997) present experimental evidence for the impact of f...
We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA...
Each economic actor is characterized by his own evaluations, traits, and strategies. Although hetero...
We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexi...
Myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tende...
We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexi...
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently ar...
We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfol...
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently are...
In this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by analyzing individu...
We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy an...
Empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind-ing period ...
Empirical research has demonstrated that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer period of...
We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA...
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominent explanation for the equity premium ...
In a recent QJE-article, Gneezy and Potters (1997) present experimental evidence for the impact of f...
We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA...
Each economic actor is characterized by his own evaluations, traits, and strategies. Although hetero...
We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexi...
Myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tende...
We experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexi...
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently ar...
We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfol...
Investors who are more willing to accept risks when evaluating their investments less frequently are...
In this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by analyzing individu...
We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy an...