The Possible Use of Chemical Warfare Agents in Southeast Asia

As early as 1976, reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons began to emerge from Laos; similar reports started to come from Kampuchea in 1978, and since 1979 from Afghanistan, but the early reports were fragmentary and not always consistent. In the fall of 1975, a U.S. Army medical team visited Thailand to conduct refugee interviews, and the team established that three basic groups of symp-toms and sign occurred after attacks: skin burns, bleeding and death in spasms and convulsions1. The United States made repeated presentations to the world press and to the United Nations and, after circulation of a comprehensive documentation to UN member states, a number of nations suggested that an impartial investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons be carried out. To this end, in December 1980, the UN adopted a resolution (A35/144C) establishing a UN investigation by a group of technical experts. On September 13, 1981, the U.S. Secretary of State, General Haig, charged that the U.S. had obtained physical evidence of the use of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia, however, the UN group of experts which visited Thailand in November, 1981, and interviewed refugees and eyewitnesses, was unable to reach a definite conclusion. The Report of the UN Group of Experts2 stated also that the group had been unable to carry out all the actions it had intended, such as on-site visits in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. Consequently, the UN adopted a resolution (A/36/96C) to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts for another year. The U.S. Charges have implications that extend beyond the par-ticular horrors they allege: the user(s) of mycotoxins as chemical war-fare agents may be in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol3 and/o