Penultimate draft; to appear in Rose (ed.), Experimental Philosophy and Metaphysics: Bloomsbury

When does mereological composition occur? For instance, if a paper plate is positioned on a table between a plastic knife and a metal fork, does this scattered plurality of diverse objects make up a single composite object (a ‘table setting’) or not? Or if two people shake hands, does this connected plurality of similar objects make up a single composite object (shaped like a sculpture of two people shaking hands) or not? In general, when does a collection of things form a whole? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (2002: 60) declares that ‘the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist’s language. ’ And Markosian (1998: 211) sets out from the claim that ‘no one has yet defended a view … consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe’s composite objects.’ Yet there is widespread disagreement among metaphysicians as to what the folk intuit about mereological composition and why they do so, and no empirical discipline to the debate. We see this situation as an opportunity to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Accordingly we aim to discover when the folk tend to think that composition occurs, and why they do so. So our question is: when do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? That is, what is folk mereology, against which metaphysical accounts of real mereology might be measured