Folk Mereology

When does mereological composition occur? For instance, if a paper plate is positioned on a table between a plastic knife and a metal fork, does this scattered plurality of diverse objects make up a single composite object (a “table setting”) or not? Or if two people shake hands, or even glue their hands together, does this connected or even bonded plurality of similar objects make up a single composite object (shaped like a sculpture of two people shaking hands) or not? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that fits with folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing to do so. For instance, Hirsch (2002: 60) declares that “the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist’s language. ” And Markosian (1998: 211) sets out from the claim that “no one has yet defended a view … consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe’s composite objects.” Yet there is wide disagreement among metaphysicians as to what the folk intuit about mereological composition and why they do so, and no empirical discipline to the discussion. We see this situation as an opportunity to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Accordingly we aim to discover when the folk tend to think that composition occurs, and why they do so. So our question is: when do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? That is, what is the folk theor