We consider the linear recurrence relation Vt.x/DPmiD1.aixCbi /Vti.x/C cxCf wherem> 1, ai and bi, 16 i 6m, are integers. The RSA and LUC schemes can be defined by this relation. In this paper we show that if the linear recurrence relation has some properties, the public-key scheme based on it cannot withstand the common modulus and chosen-message attacks, no matter what the order m is and what the parameters for ai and bi, 16 i 6m, are. This implies that the LUC cryptosystem cannot withstand the common modulus attack and the LUC digital signature scheme cannot withstand the chosen-messag
Let us consider a system in which a group of entities have all the same encyption exponent e, but, e...
A special group based on a linear recurrence equation plays an important role in modern cryptography...
Abstract. We consider RSA-type schemes with modulus N = p r q for r ≥ 2. We present two new attacks ...
The LUC4,6 cryptosystem is a system analogy with RSA cryptosystem and extended from LUC and LUC3 cry...
LUC4 cryptosystem is derived from a fourth order linear recurrence relation and is based on the Luca...
This paper reports an investigation into an attack on the LUC4 cryptosystem. LUC4 cryptosystem is de...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA modulus of type N = p²q. Given k RSA moduli Nі = p²iqi for k ...
We review the well-known relation between Lucas sequences and exponentiation. This leads to the obse...
Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryp...
We try to provide an alternative attitude toward the use of a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG her...
Abstract. We introduce an attack against the ISO/IEC 9796–1 digital signature scheme using redundanc...
Lenstra’s attack uses Chinese remainder theorem as a tool and requires a faulty signature to be succ...
In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fr...
. In this paper we present a new class of attacks against RSA with low encrypting exponent. The atta...
Lenstra’s attack uses Chinese remainder theorem as a tool and requires a faulty signature to be succ...
Let us consider a system in which a group of entities have all the same encyption exponent e, but, e...
A special group based on a linear recurrence equation plays an important role in modern cryptography...
Abstract. We consider RSA-type schemes with modulus N = p r q for r ≥ 2. We present two new attacks ...
The LUC4,6 cryptosystem is a system analogy with RSA cryptosystem and extended from LUC and LUC3 cry...
LUC4 cryptosystem is derived from a fourth order linear recurrence relation and is based on the Luca...
This paper reports an investigation into an attack on the LUC4 cryptosystem. LUC4 cryptosystem is de...
This paper proposes new attacks on RSA modulus of type N = p²q. Given k RSA moduli Nі = p²iqi for k ...
We review the well-known relation between Lucas sequences and exponentiation. This leads to the obse...
Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryp...
We try to provide an alternative attitude toward the use of a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG her...
Abstract. We introduce an attack against the ISO/IEC 9796–1 digital signature scheme using redundanc...
Lenstra’s attack uses Chinese remainder theorem as a tool and requires a faulty signature to be succ...
In this work we re-examine two common modulus attacks on RSA. First, we show that Guo's continued fr...
. In this paper we present a new class of attacks against RSA with low encrypting exponent. The atta...
Lenstra’s attack uses Chinese remainder theorem as a tool and requires a faulty signature to be succ...
Let us consider a system in which a group of entities have all the same encyption exponent e, but, e...
A special group based on a linear recurrence equation plays an important role in modern cryptography...
Abstract. We consider RSA-type schemes with modulus N = p r q for r ≥ 2. We present two new attacks ...