A Chosen Message Attack on ISO/IEC 9796-1 Signature Scheme

Abstract. We introduce an attack against the ISO/IEC 9796–1 digital signature scheme using redundancy, taking advantage of the multiplicative property of the RSA and Rabin cryptosystems. The forged signature of 1 message is obtained from the signature of 3 others for any public exponent v. For even v, the modulus is factored from the signature of 4 messages, or just 2 for v = 2. The attacker must select the above messages from a particular message subset, which size grows exponentialy with the public modulus bit size. The attack is computationally inexpensive, and works for any modulus of 16z, 16z ± 1, or 16z ± 2bits. This prompts the need to revise ISO/IEC 9796–1, or avoid its use in situations where an adversary could obtain the signature of even a few mostly chosen messages.