Implicature, Inference and Cancellability

The standard position in pragmatics to date has been that cancellability is useful way of differentiating implicatures from logical implications, semantic entail-ments and the like. In recent years, however, there has been considerable debate as to whether implicatures are in fact always cancellable, or indeed whether they are cancellable at all, amongst linguistic pragmaticians and language philosophers. In this chapter, it is suggested that cancellability encompasses a range of actions that play out in different ways depending on whether we are analysing inferences that can lead to implicatures or the implicatures themselves. In this way, we can see how analysts have often underplayed the contingency of inferences as well as the inherent indeterminacy of implicatures in such debates. It is proposed that cancel-lability should thus be the subject of further empirically-driven analyses in order to provide a solid foundation for the theorization of implicature.