protection to effectively immunize programs against control flow hijacking exploits such as Return Oriented Programming (ROP) [2] and return-to-libc attacks [3]. DCL improves upon Address Space Partitioning (ASP), an earlier technique presented to defeat memory exploits. Unlike ASP, our solution keeps the full virtual address space available to the protected program. Additionally, our combination of DCL with Multi-Variant Execution is transparent to both the user and the programmer and incurs much less overhead than other ROP defense tools, both in terms of run time and memory footprint
Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software...
Exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities in widely-used software has been a threat for over...
Defenses such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), and sta...
In this paper, we present Disjoint Code Layouts (DCL), a technique that complements Multi-Variant Ex...
Prior work has shown that return oriented programming (ROP) can be used to bypass W⊕X, a software de...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) offers a robust attack technique that has, not surprisingly, been ...
Detecting and preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities is highly challenging. Un...
ROP attack introduced briefly in this paper is a serious threat to compute systems. Kernel ROP attac...
Address-space layout randomization is a wellestablished defense against code-reuse attacks. However,...
Attackers able to compromise the memory of a target machine can change its behavior and usually gain...
Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web...
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a technique that enables an adversary to construct malicious pr...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in widely used software has been a threat for almo...
Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software...
Exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities in widely-used software has been a threat for over...
Defenses such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), and sta...
In this paper, we present Disjoint Code Layouts (DCL), a technique that complements Multi-Variant Ex...
Prior work has shown that return oriented programming (ROP) can be used to bypass W⊕X, a software de...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) offers a robust attack technique that has, not surprisingly, been ...
Detecting and preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities is highly challenging. Un...
ROP attack introduced briefly in this paper is a serious threat to compute systems. Kernel ROP attac...
Address-space layout randomization is a wellestablished defense against code-reuse attacks. However,...
Attackers able to compromise the memory of a target machine can change its behavior and usually gain...
Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web...
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a technique that enables an adversary to construct malicious pr...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in widely used software has been a threat for almo...
Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software...
Exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities in widely-used software has been a threat for over...
Defenses such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), and sta...