In this paper, we present Disjoint Code Layouts (DCL), a technique that complements Multi-Variant Execution and WX protection to effectively immunize programs against control flow hijacking exploits such as Return Oriented Programming (ROP) and return-to-libc attacks. DCL improves upon Address Space Partitioning (ASP), an earlier technique presented to defeat memory exploits. Unlike ASP, our solution keeps the full virtual address space available to the protected program. Additionally, our combination of DCL with Multi-Variant Execution is transparent to both the user and the programmer and incurs much less overhead than other ROP defense tools, both in terms of run time and memory footprint
Exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in widely used software has been a threat for almo...
To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often prote...
Abstract. Despite the large number of proposed countermeasures against control-flow hijacking attack...
In this paper, we present Disjoint Code Layouts (DCL), a technique that complements Multi-Variant Ex...
protection to effectively immunize programs against control flow hijacking exploits such as Return O...
Prior work has shown that return oriented programming (ROP) can be used to bypass W⊕X, a software de...
Address-space layout randomization is a wellestablished defense against code-reuse attacks. However,...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Detecting and preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities is highly challenging. Un...
Despite the large number of proposed countermeasures against control-flow hijacking attacks, these a...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) offers a robust attack technique that has, not surprisingly, been ...
Software immunity through diversity is a promising research direction. Address Space Layout Randomi...
Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software...
Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web...
Instruction set randomization (ISR) was initially proposed with the main goal of countering code-inj...
Exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in widely used software has been a threat for almo...
To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often prote...
Abstract. Despite the large number of proposed countermeasures against control-flow hijacking attack...
In this paper, we present Disjoint Code Layouts (DCL), a technique that complements Multi-Variant Ex...
protection to effectively immunize programs against control flow hijacking exploits such as Return O...
Prior work has shown that return oriented programming (ROP) can be used to bypass W⊕X, a software de...
Address-space layout randomization is a wellestablished defense against code-reuse attacks. However,...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) has become the primary exploitation technique for system compromis...
Detecting and preventing exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities is highly challenging. Un...
Despite the large number of proposed countermeasures against control-flow hijacking attacks, these a...
Return-oriented programming (ROP) offers a robust attack technique that has, not surprisingly, been ...
Software immunity through diversity is a promising research direction. Address Space Layout Randomi...
Code-reuse attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) pose a severe threat to modern software...
Control-flow hijacking attacks allow adversaries to take over seemingly benign software, e.g., a web...
Instruction set randomization (ISR) was initially proposed with the main goal of countering code-inj...
Exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in widely used software has been a threat for almo...
To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often prote...
Abstract. Despite the large number of proposed countermeasures against control-flow hijacking attack...