We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channels. Cache-Audit takes as input a program binary and a cache con-figuration, and it derives formal, quantitative security guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel ad-versaries, namely those based on observing cache states, traces of hits and misses, and execution times. Our technical contributions include novel abstractions to efficiently compute precise overapproximations of the possible side-channel observations for each of these ad-versaries. These approximations then yield upper bounds on the information that is revealed. In case studies we ap-ply CacheAudit to binary executables of algorithms for symmetric encryption and sorting...
Abstract—In this paper we analyze three methods to detect cache-based side-channel attacks in real t...
In the recent years, cache based side-channel attacks have become a serious threat for computers. To...
Abstract Cache attacks exploit side-channel information that is leaked by a microprocessor’s cache. ...
We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channe...
Software cache-based side channel attacks are a serious new class of threats for computers. Unlike p...
Performance has been and will continue to be a key criterion in the development of computer systems ...
Cache side-channel attacks exhibit severe threats to software security and privacy, especially for c...
Modern computer architectures share physical resources between different programs in order to increa...
Abstract—We explore software diversity as a defense against side-channel attacks by dynamically and ...
In this paper, we present a methodology to evaluate the feasibility, effectiveness and complexity of...
Security and trustworthiness are key considerations in designing modern processor hardware. It has b...
Today, nearly all modern devices, including smartphones, PCs, and cloud servers, benefit significant...
Abstract. Formally bounding side-channel leakage is important to bridge the gap between the theory a...
We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al. [14], of cache memory being used as a side-channel ...
International audienceCache Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) have gained a lot of attention in the recent...
Abstract—In this paper we analyze three methods to detect cache-based side-channel attacks in real t...
In the recent years, cache based side-channel attacks have become a serious threat for computers. To...
Abstract Cache attacks exploit side-channel information that is leaked by a microprocessor’s cache. ...
We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channe...
Software cache-based side channel attacks are a serious new class of threats for computers. Unlike p...
Performance has been and will continue to be a key criterion in the development of computer systems ...
Cache side-channel attacks exhibit severe threats to software security and privacy, especially for c...
Modern computer architectures share physical resources between different programs in order to increa...
Abstract—We explore software diversity as a defense against side-channel attacks by dynamically and ...
In this paper, we present a methodology to evaluate the feasibility, effectiveness and complexity of...
Security and trustworthiness are key considerations in designing modern processor hardware. It has b...
Today, nearly all modern devices, including smartphones, PCs, and cloud servers, benefit significant...
Abstract. Formally bounding side-channel leakage is important to bridge the gap between the theory a...
We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al. [14], of cache memory being used as a side-channel ...
International audienceCache Side Channel Attacks (SCAs) have gained a lot of attention in the recent...
Abstract—In this paper we analyze three methods to detect cache-based side-channel attacks in real t...
In the recent years, cache based side-channel attacks have become a serious threat for computers. To...
Abstract Cache attacks exploit side-channel information that is leaked by a microprocessor’s cache. ...