Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game G have fast convergenceto a set A if the models both reach A quickly and leave A slowly. where quicklyand slowly refer to whether convergence times remain nite in the N! 1 limit. We provide Lyapunov criteria which are su ¢ cient for reaching quickly and leaving slowly, and apply them to a number of examples which illustrate how they depend on the degree of risk-dominance in the game, noise levels, the nature of the decision rule, and the nature of the infomation on which players base their decisions.
International audienceWe present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have...
This work is concerned with the fast–slow dynamics for intraguild predation models with evolutionary...
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social sc...
Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence ...
Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence”...
Abstract. Stochastic selection models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the...
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential ...
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilib...
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential ...
Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
International audienceWe consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics to learn equilibria in...
The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary " models with s-noise like those which h...
Abstract. We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dy-namics to study multipopulation dynamics...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
International audienceWe present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have...
This work is concerned with the fast–slow dynamics for intraguild predation models with evolutionary...
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social sc...
Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence ...
Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence”...
Abstract. Stochastic selection models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the...
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential ...
We study how long it takes for large populations of interacting agents to come close to Nash equilib...
We introduce the concept of a Lyapunov game as a subclass of strictly dominated games and potential ...
Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N...
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called ‘stochastic slowd...
International audienceWe consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics to learn equilibria in...
The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary " models with s-noise like those which h...
Abstract. We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dy-namics to study multipopulation dynamics...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
International audienceWe present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have...
This work is concerned with the fast–slow dynamics for intraguild predation models with evolutionary...
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social sc...