Add to ORKGCross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limit...
Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank r...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
Abstract: Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently t...
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low le...
We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline o...
The cross-country evidences from two empirical approaches presented in this paper show that explicit...
Deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limit...
Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank r...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
Abstract: Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently t...
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low le...
We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline o...
The cross-country evidences from two empirical approaches presented in this paper show that explicit...
Deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an expl...
On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limit...
Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank r...