Abstract: Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design f...
This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies fo...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low le...
Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces requ...
Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-co...
Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance (DI) adoption, discussing the cross...
The paper contrasts deposit protection with other forms of insurance, examines why goods and service...
Recently several countries have implemented explicit deposit insurance systems. In most countries th...
This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance (DI) schemes on bilateral cross-border deposits....
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify factors that influence decisions about a country’s financial ...
We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline o...
Deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design f...
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design f...
This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies fo...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low le...
Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces requ...
Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance adoption. It discusses the cross-co...
Abstract: This paper illustrates the trends in deposit insurance (DI) adoption, discussing the cross...
The paper contrasts deposit protection with other forms of insurance, examines why goods and service...
Recently several countries have implemented explicit deposit insurance systems. In most countries th...
This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance (DI) schemes on bilateral cross-border deposits....
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify factors that influence decisions about a country’s financial ...
We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline o...
Deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design f...
We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design f...
This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies fo...
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that...