Add to ORKGAbstract: Incorporating a durable-good monopoly model, this paper reexamines the argument on fee versus royalty licensing. It is shown that the non-producing patent holder prefers to license his cost-reducing innovation by means of royalty. However he is willing to license his horizontal product innovation by using fixed-fee contract. In the case of vertical product innovation, the patentee’s preference depends on both the time of licensing and the degree of quality improvement. JEL classification: D45; D42; L1
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her...
The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity ...
In this paper, we analyse a situation where a patent holder is considered as an upstream firm who ca...
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing ...
This paper finds that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holdin...
This paper explores how an inventor should license an innovation that opens new markets for the lice...
This paper considers the allocation of essential patents by a pro\u85t maximiz-ing monopoly. Using a...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
June 13, 2008This paper analyzes how an inventor should fix the licensing terms to license a standar...
We study how a firm licenses a product improvement innovation to its rival in the final market. Cont...
We analyse the problem of a non-producing patentee who licenses an essential process innovation to a...
This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a C...
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a \u85xed fee when her...
This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a ...
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her...
The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity ...
In this paper, we analyse a situation where a patent holder is considered as an upstream firm who ca...
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing ...
This paper finds that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holdin...
This paper explores how an inventor should license an innovation that opens new markets for the lice...
This paper considers the allocation of essential patents by a pro\u85t maximiz-ing monopoly. Using a...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
June 13, 2008This paper analyzes how an inventor should fix the licensing terms to license a standar...
We study how a firm licenses a product improvement innovation to its rival in the final market. Cont...
We analyse the problem of a non-producing patentee who licenses an essential process innovation to a...
This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a C...
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a \u85xed fee when her...
This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a ...
This paper explores a licensor's choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a fixed fee when her...
The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity ...
In this paper, we analyse a situation where a patent holder is considered as an upstream firm who ca...